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"I'd appreciate it if you could find a way to place debits and credits so an
ordinary citizen like myself could understand what you are trying to
show .... I don't think that the financial advisor of God himself would be
able to understand what the financial position of the Government of the
United States is, by reading your statement. And I have been going





No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of
the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time.'
This Clause establishes two related duties: a negative appropriations require-
ment and an affirmative reporting obligation. While several constitutional
scholars have explored the appropriations requirementI there is limited schol-
arship on the corollary reporting obligation. Even among legal scholars, the
Statement and Account Clause has been considered only in the context of na-
tional security matters.4 This Note marks a first step in filling this void.
1. HARRY S. TRUMAN, OFF THE RECORD: THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF HARRY S. TRUMAN
398-99 (Robert H. Ferrel, ed., 1980).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
3. See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1345 (1988) (arguing
that the Appropriations Clause prohibits the expenditure of any public money
without legislative approval and that congressional control imposes a "powerful
limitation[] on the executive branch"); see also J. Gregory Sidak, The President's
Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1172-73 (1989) (contending that the Clause
does not vest Congress with exclusive control of the public fisc insofar as such
control would undermine the unitary executive).
4. Only two government publications, two contemporary pieces of scholarship, and
a series of blog posts discuss the Statement and Account Clause. See RICHARD A.
BEST & ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 94-261, INTELLIGENCE
SPENDING: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ISSUES 18-32 (2006), http://www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/crs/94-261.pdf (exploring whether the Statement and Account Clause
compels full disclosure of aggregate intelligence spending); i U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o4-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW 1-11 to 1-13 (3d ed. 2004), http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/2o2437.pdf (discuss-
ing how the Statement and Account Clause serves as a corollary to the Appropria-
tions Clause) [hereinafter 1 GAO RED BOOK]; Louis Fisher, Presidential Budgetary
Duties, 42 PRES. STUD. Q. 4 (2012) (discussing covert spending for national security
purposes); Elliot E. Maxwell, Note, The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution,
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The Statement and Account Clause was intended to provide the public with
a complete understanding of the government's "receipts and expenditures." Ac-
curate reporting is not necessary merely for responsible fiscal management; it
ensures that the citizenry is informed about government spending priorities and
that public officials are accountable to the people. As Justice Thurgood Marshall
wrote in Brock v. Pierce County, "the protection of the public fisc is a matter that
is of interest to every citizen."' It goes to the heart of democratic legitimacy.
Yet the plain meaning of this constitutional provision is being violated in
several ways. Off-budget vehicles, such as revolving funds and insurance pro-
grams, are central to the way that the government conducts business.' Particu-
larly today, in a time of constrained budgets and political dysfunction, these
"budget gimmicks" have ballooned to well over four trillion dollars As a result,
the federal government has enormous financial obligations that are not reflect-
ed (or are substantially under-represented) in public reporting. This state of af-
fairs defies an unambiguous constitutional mandate, jeopardizes democratic
accountability to the public, and masks the scope of our nation's fiscal prob-
lems.
84 YALE L.J. 608 (1975) (exploring the national-security exemptions to the disclo-
sure requirement in the Statement and Account Clause); Joseph Marren, The
Statement and Account Clause and Citizens United, JURIST: SIDEBAR (2013),
http://jurist.org/sidebar/2013/o1/joseph-marren-citizens-parti.php (arguing that
the Statement and Account Clause should be enforced as a First Amendment right
to information). Some historical Articles mention the Statement and Account
Clause. See, e.g., Frederick A. Cleveland, How We Have Been Getting Along With-
out a Budget, 9 PROC. AM. POL. Scl. ASS'N 47 (1912). The Statement and Account
Clause is also mentioned in two works on the information flow between the gov-
ernment and the people. See Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Juris-
prudence of Information Flow: How the Constitution Constructs the Pathways of In-
formation, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 272 n.6o (2003); David Mitchell Ivester, Note,
The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109, 130 n.89, 131 n.93
(1977).
5. 476 U.S. 253, 262 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Howell Jackson, Counting the Ways: The Structure of Federal Spending, in
FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 185
(Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008) (discussing how government accounting con-
cepts offer an incomplete picture of the government's financial obligations and
fail to capture liabilities incurred as loans, loan guarantees, and emergency pro-
grams); David Mosso, Beyond the Spotlight: Accountability of the Federal Gov-
ernment, Remarks at Fordham Law School "Representation Without Accounta-
bility?" Conference (Jan. 23, 2012), http://fordhamcorporatecenter.org/files/
2012/01/David-Mosso-Conference-Remarks- 1. 23.122.pdf (outlining six categories
of federal liabilities that ought to be represented in annual reports to accurately
depict the government's financial position).
7. See, e.g., Cheryl Block, Budget Gimmicks, in FISCAL CHALLENGES, supra note 6, at
39.
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This Note is divided into four Parts. Part I examines the history, language,
and original purposes of the Statement and Account Clause. This analysis re-
veals that the Clause was intended to create transparency and accountability,
ensure congressional oversight over the fisc, and prevent corruption. These ob-
jectives not only clarify what is required under the Clause, but also operate as
standards against which to evaluate modern reporting processes.'
Part II turns to my central thesis: that reporting processes at the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
and the Treasury Department do not fulfill the three principles embodied in
this constitutional provision.9 Specifically, the use of cash accounting and exclu-
sion of certain liabilities continue to plague federal reporting. These issues have
taken on a new importance in light of the recent financial crisis.o While schol-
ars have noted that fiscal information provided by the government is woefully
incomplete," I suggest that Congress' inadequate reporting is unlawful.
Part III moves beyond typical reporting processes and considers two specif-
ic examples of budget practices that, by statutory design, evade complete and
accurate reporting: the off-balance-sheet treatment of federal insurance pro-
grams and government-related entities." These practices expose an inherent
tension within the Clause: the congressional charge to report all "receipts and
expenditures" runs counter to Congress's desire to obfuscate unpopular or ex-
8. The Clause does not require a singular approach to federal reporting. Therefore,
this Note provides a standard against which to evaluate continuously evolving ac-
counting and reporting practices. It does not provide a rule-by-rule assessment of
current reporting practices, nor does it prescribe a comprehensive set of reporting
procedures that would constitute compliance with the Clause. Such specificity is
beyond the scope of this Note.
9. Today, these budget agencies produce three annual reports that most closely align
with the Clause's mandate: the President's Budget, which is produced by the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, the Economic Outlook, which is produced by
the Congressional Budget Office, and the Consolidated Financial Report, which is
produced by the Treasury.
10. Following the financial crisis, Professor Allen Schick predicted that
"[g]overnments will give increased attention to long-term sustainability of their
budgets... [and] devise new means to measure and monitor fiscal risks." Allen
Schick, Crisis Budgeting, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION &
DEVELOPMENT (Jun. 2009), http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/429724
36.pdf.
11. See sources cited supra notes 6.
12. This discussion is particularly timely in light of an April 2013 proposal by the Fed-
eral Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) to formally exclude the Fed-
eral Reserve and certain government- related entities like Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac from government accounting. This proposal would implicate, if not violate,
the spirit of the Statement and Account Clause. See FED. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
ADVISORY BD., ExPosuRE DRAFT: REPORTING ENTITY STATEMENT OF FEDERAL
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (April 2013).
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cessive spending. This raises the question: what mechanisms are available to in-
terpret and enforce this mandate?
Part IV explores this question. To date, the judiciary has been reluctant to
open its doors to litigation under this Clause. As a result, this mandate often
falls upon institutional actors to enforce. I propose expanding GAO's powers to
audit any government-related entity and render binding opinions against the
reporting agencies to improve compliance with reporting duty. I also suggest
that GAO auditors be embedded within agencies. This will increase GAO's ef-
fectiveness and improve the quality of financial data given to budget agencies.
Irrespective of this provision's enforceability, Congress still has an affirma-
tive duty to adhere to its principles. 3 In one of the few cases on the Clause ever
to reach the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas wrote a powerful dissent arguing
that "[t]he statement of accounts of public expenditures goes to the heart of the
problem of sovereignty. If taxpayers may not ask that rudimentary question,
their sovereignty becomes an empty symbol and a secret bureaucracy is allowed
to run our affairs." 4
Inscrutable and incomplete federal reporting directly contravenes the
Statement and Account Clause's core principles. While accounting is indeed an
imperfect science, public companies provide financial information in a com-
prehensive format that produces transparency and minimizes fraud. So too
should the federal government. 5
I. THREE PRINCIPLES
The Statement and Account Clause was introduced in the closing days of
the Constitutional Convention, only three days before the Constitution was
signed on September 14, 1787.6 George Mason asserted that the public had a
13. Budget actors charged with overseeing the budget process and ensuring that agen-
cies follow fiscal law include the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the General
Accountability Office (GAO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
the Department of Treasury. Therefore, this paper has practical significance for
how budget actors conceive of and seek to meet their institutional mandates. For
the authoritative works on the budget process, see ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL
BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, AND PROCESS (3d ed., 2007); and ROBERT KEITH &
ALLEN SCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 98-721, INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL
BUDGET PROCESS 10 (Dec. 2003).
14. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 201 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
15. Most economists agree public accounting is "light years behind accounting in the
private sector," making federal programs appear to cost taxpayers less than in re-
ality. Beverly A. Caley, Reforming Credit Reform: Federal Accounting Rules Down-
play the Costs of Extending Credit, KELLOGG INSIGHTS BLOG, http://insight.
kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/reforming-credit-reform; see Deborah Lucas &
Marvin Phaup, Reforming Credit Reform, 28 PUBLIC BUDGETING & FINANCE 90
(20o8).
16. Sidak, supra note 3, at 1172-73.
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"right to know" how its money was spent, and introduced a clause requiring an
annual account of public expenditures.'7 His suggestion was not without prece-
dent. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation included a similar requirement
that the Congress "transmit[] every half-year to the respective states an account
of the sums so borrowed or emitted."'8
The Framers did not debate the inclusion of this Clause, nor did they ques-
tion its proposed scope to account for "all public Money." In fact, the Journal of
the Convention notes that it was proposed "nem. con."-with no one contra-
dicting.'9 There was a general consensus that "[tihe People who give their Mon-
ey ought to know in what manner it is expended," James McHenry later ex-
plained."o
Only the time frame practicable to produce a thorough report of public ex-
penditures was subject to debate. Under the Articles of the Confederation, it
had proved unworkable to produce a financial report every six months." So, af-
ter limited debate, the Clause was eventually passed with the phrase "from time
to time" and appended to the appropriations requirement." Beginning in the
second session of the First Congress, Congress required the Treasurer of the
United States to provide a quarterly expenditure report to Congress. This re-
porting mandate was thus followed from the Republic's outset.
The Statement and Account Clause creates an affirmative obligation that
Congress "publish" a comprehensive report of the government's "receipts and
17. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 618 (Max Farrand, ed.,
191) (hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS]. Kate Stith notes the oddity that the Arti-
cles of Confederation included both an appropriations and an accounting re-
quirement, yet the appropriations requirement was proposed alone at the Consti-
tutional Convention: "Madison does not record any discussion of why the
statement and account clause was subsequently appended to the appropriations
requirement in section 9." Stith, supra note 3, at 1357 n.64. While this could have
been an oversight, it may be attributable to the fact that the bi-annual accounting
requirement under the Articles of Confederation proved too onerous to meet.
18. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX.
19. 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 17, at 610 n.2.
20. Id. at 149-50. In Britain, Parliamentary control over the purse was an important
check on the monarchy's power. It is likely that the British experience influenced
the Framers. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 763-65.
21. Madison stated: "The Articles of Confederation require half-yearly publications
on this subject. A punctual compliance being often impossible, the practice has
ceased altogether." i W. BENTON, 1787 DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1004-05
(1986).
22. There is no record of a debate over the Clause's placement next to the appropria-
tion power in Article i, Section 9 of the Constitution. The obvious reading is that
this reporting requirement ensures government funds are used in a manner con-
sistent with congressional intent.
23. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1141 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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expenditures." Its specificity is notable: the Clause requires a "regular" state-
ment of "all" public money. It contemplates no exemptions to this ex post re-
porting requirement. As Henry Lee argued at the Constitutional Convention,
"time to time" had to mean "short, convenient periods."4
Importantly, the Clause does not prescribe accounting forms or require a
singular approach to reporting. Its mandate can be met in multiple ways. In-
deed, the complexity of government finances and the sophistication of account-
ing techniques have greatly evolved since the Constitution's enactment. Today's
reporting process is the accumulation of complex statutory mandates, account-
ing guidelines, and agency customs.
What is required to satisfy the Statement and Account Clause's require-
ments? Identifying a satisfying conceptual framework for the structure and
scope of federal reporting is a challenging task.2 5 What constitutes a financial
24. 3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 459 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [herein-
after ELLIOT'S DEBATES).
25. For example, should payments by individuals to insurance companies through
federal exchanges be represented as a federal liability? In 1994, former CBO Direc-
tor Bob Reischauer, a Democratic appointee, mandated that private healthcare
payments be included in the federal budget-an accounting decision that in-
creased the bill's projected cost by sixty percent and contributed to the demise of
President Clinton's healthcare legislation. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN ANALYSIS
OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S HEALTH PROPOSAL (Feb. 1994); George Hager, Brunt of
Budget Battle Falls on CBO Chiefs Findings, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1999,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/budget/stories/crippen
102399.htm; see also Reihan Salam, Is the Failure of the Mandate a Disaster for the
Right?, NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Jan. 14, 2010). In 2009, former CBO Director Peter
Orszag, also a Democratic appointee, did not include the similar costs in the esti-
mates of President Obama's healthcare legislation, thereby allowing the healthcare
law to be more fiscally viable than it would have been had such mandates been in-
cluded. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
(NOV. 2009); Michael F. Cannon, Bland CBO Memo, or Smoking Gun?, CATO AT
LIBERTY (CATO INST.) (Dec. 16, 2009 7:49 AM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/
bland-cbo-memo-or-smoking-gun. This example not only shows the strong disa-
greement among budget experts of the same party as to what should be included
in a federal financial report, but it also demonstrates the enormous consequences
of such reporting decisions in policy outcomes. Another contemporary example is
whether and how to represent the significant losses that the Federal Reserve will
incur as a result of its quantitative easing program. See David Greenlaw et al.,
Crunch Time: Fiscal Crises and the Role of Monetary Policy (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 19297, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl9297.
In addition, the treatment of tax expenditures has been subject to extended de-
bate. See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman & Marvin Phaup, Tax Expenditures, the Size and
Efficiency of Government, and Implications for Budget Reform (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17268, 2011), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w]7268. This Note does not attempt to resolve these thorny accounting
questions. It focuses on government "receipts and expenditures" that fall squarely
within basic accounting frameworks. For a further discussion of non-traditional
liabilities of the state, see sources cited supra note 6.
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obligation of the federal government? How broadly should government "re-
ceipts and expenditures" be construed? Is cash accounting sufficient to accu-
rately depict government liabilities or should commonplace private-sector
techniques such as accrual accounting be used?
To fully comprehend what is required under the Statement and Account
Clause, one must understand the Clause's original three objectives." In 1977,
Elliot Maxwell published a Note that briefly discussed the primary objectives of
the Statement and Account Clause:
The most obvious [objective] is that it allows the people to see the
course of policy as reflected in governmental expenditures. . . . It allows
the people, jointly with Congress, to determine if the expenditures by
the Executive reflect the intent embodied in the appropriations. The
information also provides an opportunity for the people to scrutinize
appropriations by Congress and expenditures by the Executive to de-
termine if they were for purposes allowed by the Constitution. Finally,
on a somewhat more mundane level, the information allows the peo-
ple, as Story put it, to detect "errors," uncover "misapplication of
funds," and discover "corruption and public peculation," supplement-
ing the efforts of law enforcement officials charged with unearthing
wrongdoing. 7
Maxwell's framework provides a useful starting point to understanding the
three key objectives embodied in the Statement and Account Clause: to ensure
transparency and accountability, maintain congressional oversight over the fisc,
and prevent corruption. These objectives not only clarify what is required by
the Clause in the abstract, but also operate as standards by which to assess
whether the Clause is being met in practice. Evaluating today's reporting regime
against the Framer's three purposes allows for a dynamic understanding of this
mandate.
A. Accountability Through Transparency
First, the Clause embodies democratic accountability to the people and
goes to the heart of representative government. It allows citizens to evaluate
how Congress governs by requiring a "statement and account" of how public
resources are used. Indeed, this was the Framers' explicit intent. Chancellor Liv-
ingston declared during the New York debates over ratifying the Constitution
in 1788:
26. While historical context grounds my assessment of the Clause, I am not advocat-
ing for a static interpretation. At the time of its enactment, basic accounting con-
cepts did not exist to accurately represent government "receipts and expendi-
tures." Nor did the Framers contemplate the complex financing mechanisms that
are commonplace today.
27. Maxwell, supra note 4, at 615-16 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1348 (1833)).
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Congress are to publish, from time to time, an account of their receipts
and expenditures. These may be compared together; and if the former,
year after year, exceed the latter, the corruption will be detected, and
the people may use the constitutional mode of redress.
David Ramsey, a commentator on the proposed Constitution, echoed this view
in a 1788 pamphlet: "The people of the United States who pay, are to be judges
how far their money is properly applied."2 9
Madison also held the strong belief that transparency was the primary
means by which the federal government is held accountable to the people. In
Federalist 26, Hamilton explained that, "as often as the question [on military
spending] comes forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to
the subject, by the party in opposition." 30 Several decades later, James Madison
articulated the same view in a letter to W.T. Barry: "[a] popular Government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to
a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both... . [A] people who mean to be their
own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."3'
For Madison, information was central to the democratic process.
The quality of that information was also important to the Framers. During
the Constitutional Convention, the only point of contention around the State-
ment and Account Clause was the time frame needed to produce a "thorough"
report. Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that reporting more than once per
year "would be impracticable. [Congress] might indeed make a monthly publi-
cation, but it would be in such general statements as would afford no satisfacto-
ry information."32 In response, James Madison suggested that "giving [Con-
gress] an opportunity of publishing [statements]. . . from time to time, as might
be found easy and convenient" would allow for statements that "would be more
full and satisfactory to the public, and would be sufficiently frequent."33 Sup-
porters of Madison's proposal explained that, "if the interval were fixed and
proved to be too short, the statements would cease as they had done under the
Articles, be incomplete, or be too general to be satisfactory." 4 They wanted to
ensure that reporting would be comprehensive and useful to the public.
28. Id. at 615 n-44.
29. David Ramsey, An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the Subject of the
Federal Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
372, 374 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888).
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton). Although Hamilton was discussing
the Appropriations Clause, his logic similarly applies to the reporting obligation.
31. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Member of the Ky. House of Repre-
sentatives (Aug. 4, 1822), in i THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 18 (1987).
32. Maxwell, supra note 4, at 610 n.18 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
33. Id. at 622 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 610 (internal citations omitted). At the time of its enactment, foreign ob-
servers were interested in the Statement and Account Clause. In 1788, the French
513
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Importantly, there is no evidence that the Framers contemplated any ex-
emptions to the simple yet broad requirement of financial transparency." Dur-
ing the debate on June 17, 1788, George Mason objected to the phrase from
"time to time" because he feared this ambiguity would result in secrecy. 6 He
believed that,
[i]n matters relative to military operations and foreign negotiations,
secrecy was necessary sometimes. But [he] did not conceive that the re-
ceipts and expenditures of the public money ought ever to be con-
cealed. . . . But this expression was so loose, it might be concealed for-
ever from them, and might afford opportunities of misapplying the
public money, and sheltering those who did it.
Madison replied that his point was not to exempt secret affairs, but rather to
delay their publication.3' But Patrick Henry countered that a report of public
finances posed no security threat: "[G]entlemen say that the publication from
time to time is a security unknown in our state government! ... [But] the peo-
ple see the journals of our legislature, and hear their debates, every day." 9 For
Henry, the norm of transparency superseded any security concerns.
Other constitutional provisions bolster this understanding of the Clause.
The concept of creating accountability through transparency is pervasive
throughout the Constitution. For example, the Journal Clause demonstrates
this concept of full transparency by requiring the publication of congressional
debates. 4o The Presentment Clause, outlining a public voting procedure, also
philosopher and economist Marquise de Condorcet wrote an essay on the new
United States, commenting that "[a]n unspecified period of time to account for
the use of public funds can lead to the most pernicious effects." CONDORCET:
WRITINGS ON THE UNITED STATES 54 (Guillaume Ansart ed. & trans., 2012).
35. As early as 1790, Congress authorized $40,000 for expenditures in foreign disclo-
sure that could be kept secret if the President determined "it advisable not to
specify." Fisher, supra note 4, at 756 (internal citations and quotation marks omit-
ted). On national-security exemptions, see Maxwell, supra note 4.
36. 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 17, at 326.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 327. The Administration's brief in United States v. Richardson presents a dif-
ferent interpretation of the Framers' intent: "As the debates make clear, the prin-
cipal reason for modifying Mason's original language was to permit secrecy in
matters which required it." Brief for Petitioners at 24, United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974) (No. 72-885), 1973 WL 173861.
39. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 462. Most state constitutions did not include
similar provisions.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Unlike the Statement and Account Clause, the Journal
Clause provides "an exception to the general openness norm." Heidi Kitrosser,
"Macro-Transparency" As Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA Surveillance Con-
troversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163, 1174 (2007).
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reflects this approach.4 1 Similarly, the Speech and Debate Clause offers explicit
protection to legislators against punishment for "Speech or Debate." 42 Such
protection presumes that the legislative process will occur in the public domain
and be subject to public critique.
Thus, the Statement and Account Clause does more than simply echo the
principle of accountability pursued and implemented by the Constitution's
more famous provisions. It strengthens that principle through an absolute and
unambiguous duty to publish an account of "all public Money." As Madison
asserted during the Constitutional Convention, the Statement and Account
Clause "went farther than the constitution of any state in the Union, or perhaps
in the world."4 3
B. Strengthening Congressional Oversight of the Fisc
Second, the Statement and Account Clause strengthens and broadens Con-
gress's power of the purse. It compels Congress to actively oversee how the ex-
ecutive uses public funds, thereby effectuating the carefully designed balance of
power between the branches.
In The Fiscal Constitution, Kate Stith argues that federal reporting strength-
ens congressional oversight. Discussing both the Appropriations and Statement
and Account Clauses, she asserts:
Equivalent coverage of the two clauses does not, by itself, necessarily
imply that both include all public spending. For instance, the coverage
of each might be limited to monies raised from taxes and government
borrowing. However, the statement and account clause refers broadly
to "expenditures of public Money" (emphasis added). Therefore, this
clause expands Congress' oversight powers to all expenditures and
simultaneously curbs any fiscal discretion within the Executive
branch."
The placement of the Statement and Account Clause in Article I supports this
reading. It follows directly after the Appropriations Clause as part of a single
sentence, modifying the appropriations power and augmenting Congress's
power of the purse. And, like the Appropriations Clause, this provision is not
"self-executing," but rather falls upon Congress to carry out.45 Although mod-
ern budgeting practices might suggest otherwise, it is ultimately an obligation of
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
43. 3 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 460.
44. Stith, supra note 3, at 1357 n.65.
45. In reference to the Appropriations Clause, the D.C. Circuit wrote that "[i]t is not
self-defining and Congress has plenary power to give meaning to the provi-
sion .... [It] is to be found in various statutory provisions." Harrington v. Bush,
553 F.2d 190, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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Congress, not the executive branch. It requires Congress to ensure its appropri-
ation directions are followed.
Justice Story provides further support for this reading of the Clause's sec-
ond purpose. He stresses its importance as "a most useful and salutary check"
upon the executive, allowing Congress to ensure that the executive has expend-
ed money according to its appropriation choices. He writes:
It is highly proper, that Congress should possess the power to decide
how and when any money should be applied for these purposes. If it
were otherwise, the executive would possess an unbounded power over
the public purse of the nation; and might apply all its moneyed re-
sources at his pleasure. The power to control and direct the appropria-
tions constitutes a most useful and salutary check upon profusion and
extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public specula-
tion.... [AInd to make their responsibility complete and perfect, a
regular account of the receipts and expenditures is required to be pub-
lished, that the people may know, what money is expended, for what
purposes, and by what authority.46
C. Preventing Abuse and Corruption
Third, the Statement and Account Clause minimizes the potential for cor-
ruption and the inappropriate use of public funds. While closely related to the
Clause's accountability purpose, this third purpose relates to improper, not im-
prudent, use of funds. This reading of the Clause's third purpose subtlety differs
from Maxwell's understanding. He focused on "errors" and "misapplication" of
public funds. But particularly in the Republic's early days, the primary budget-
ary concern was corruption and abuse.
In April 1802, President Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Secretary of the
Treasury, Albert Gallatin, emphasizing that comprehensible financial reporting
is central to preventing abuse:
I think it an object of great important [sic] ... to simplify our system of
finance, and to bring it within the comprehension of every member of
Congress... . [A] simplification of the form of accounts ... [so] we
might hope to see the finances of the Union as clear and intelligible as a
merchant's books, so that every member of Congress, and every man of
any mind in the Union, should be able to comprehend them to investi-
gate abuses, and consequently to control them.47
46. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 227 (1840).
47. VIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY,
CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER WRITINGS,
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Jefferson was not alone in his concern about the misuse of funds. The GAO un-
derscores that "abuses were commonplace" in the early Republic.48 Indeed,
[als early as 1809, one senator, citing a string of abuses, introduced a
resolution to look into ways to prevent the improper expenditure of
public funds. In 1816 and 1817, John C. Calhoun lamented the "great
evil" of diverting public funds to uses other than those for which they
were appropriated. Even as late as the post-Civil War years, the situa-
tion saw little improvement.49
Thus, preventing abuse and corruption is a third, but no less important,
function of the Statement and Account Clause. It is against these three objec-
tives-ensuring transparency and accountability, maintaining congressional
control over the purse, and preventing abuse and corruption-that today's re-
porting practices should be evaluated."o
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Because the Statement and Account Clause is not self-executing, Congress
has "from time to time" enacted statutory provisions that implement the
Clause. These statutes define who is responsible for annual financial reports, the
amount of detail and scope required, the methodologies used to measure finan-
cial obligations, and exceptions to the general norm of transparency.5'
This Part provides the first complete picture of the statutory provisions that
fill the interstices of this Clause.52 I trace how this reporting duty has evolved
48. 1 GAO RED BOOK, supra note 4, at 1-11. Certain statutes related to the Appropria-
tions Clause pertain to the Statement and Account Clause's third purpose to pre-
vent misuse. See, e.g., The Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (providing
"agencies may not spend, or commit themselves to spend, in advance of or in ex-
cess of appropriations"); The Purpose Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2012) (requir-
ing that appropriations only be used for intended purposes).
49. 1 GAO RED BOOK, supra note 4, at i-ii.
50. It is unlikely that the Statement and Account Clause was originally conceived as a
check on deficit spending. Profesor Stith argues that, at the time of the Constitu-
tion's adoption, there was a strong moral imperative against deficit spending and
the accumulation of debt. Stith, supra note 3, at 1355 n.61.
51. Some statutes create budget institutions to produce an annual financial report.
Other statutes standardize how federal finances should be presented and delegate
decision-making authority with respect to public accounting. Others have as their
goal improving the accuracy of financial reporting. These provisions are largely
codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1105. GAO describes these fiscal laws as "pieces of a puzzle
that fit together to form the larger picture of how Congress exercises its control
over the 'power of the purse."' 1 GAO RED BOOK, supra note 4, at 1-12.
52. Only one other publication discusses the statutory framework through which
Congress executes its reporting duty under the Statement and Account Clause. In
2012, Joseph Marren, a corporate lawyer, published a series of blog posts through
Fordham Law School on this topic. While his blog adds to the limited scholarship,
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over the past two hundred and twenty-six years, arguing that it was always an-
cillary to the appropriations process and never fully executed by Congress."
Specifically, I contend that two major problems have persisted in federal report-
ing since the Founding: the use of cash-basis accounting for certain expendi-
tures, and the exclusion of government-related entities that lend and insure.54
Even today, these two issues continue to plague federal reporting by the Office
of Management and Budget, Congressional Budget Office, and Treasury De-
partment." Therefore, today's reporting regime violates the three original prin-
ciples embodied in the Statement and Account Clause.
While the academic literature has recognized that the information about
government spending is inadequate,"6 this Part makes a stronger claim. By fail-
ing to meet its affirmative reporting obligation, Congress is acting unlawfully-
shirking its responsibilities to be transparent to the public, to oversee the execu-
tive branch, and to minimize the potential for corruption.
it provides only a cursory treatment of this Clause. Marren shows that Congress
fails to include many federal obligations in the budget and violates its constitu-
tional requirement. However, he conflates the appropriations and reporting pro-
cesses. He also argues that the federal budget should be considered political
speech under the First Amendment. See Marren, supra note 4, at parts 1-5.
53. Scholarship on the budget process often conflates the reporting process (ex post)
with the appropriations process (ex ante). Appropriations refer to spending deci-
sions by Congress for future fiscal years, whereas reporting refers to publication of
public revenue, expenditures and outstanding financial liabilities for the prior fis-
cal year. These are two distinct activities that are conducted pursuant to different
constitutional mandates. But today, appropriations and reporting are intertwined
and executed by the same budget agencies, leading to confusion among both
scholars and practitioners.
54. Most scholars also argue that the failure to recognize the cost of funds and to ap-
ply market-based discounts meaningfully distorts federal reporting. But this claim
is subject to debate. See Deborah Lucas & Marvin Phaup, Reforming Credit Re-
form, 28 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 4 (2008) (advocating for the use of fair-value ac-
counting and a market-discount rate in federal budgeting). But see David Kamin,
Risky Returns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 IND. L.J. 724 (2013) (ar-
guing that including "cost of risk," namely the amount of risk that the private
market would bear, would improperly skew budget estimates). Recently, the Con-
gressional Budget Office outlined how risk would be incorporated in estimates of
federal credit programs. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING FOR
FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS 8 (2012) (" [Ilnstead of using Treasury rates to dis-
count... cash flows, fair-value estimates employ discounting methods that are
consistent with the risk of the loan or loan guarantee.").
55. It is unclear how an originalist would interpret this mandate because, at the time
of its enactment, basic accounting concepts did not exist to accurately represent
government "receipts and expenditures." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
56. The federal budget is both inadequate and imprecise. On its inadequacies, see
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A. The Nineteenth Century
From the nation's outset, the reporting obligation was never fully executed
by Congress and, as President Jefferson wrote, "the whole system [of govern-
ment finances] was involved in impenetrable fog."57 Public expenditures were
not transparent and accessible to the public; Congress exerted limited control
over, or knowledge of how, funds were spent; non-standardized, unaudited
agency budget submissions did little to minimize potential abuse. As an inde-
pendent mandate (apart from the appropriations process), the reporting man-
date had been all but forgotten by the close of the nineteenth century.
The First Congress delegated its reporting duty under the Statement and
Account Clause to the Treasury Secretary shortly after the Constitution's ratifi-
cation:
[I]t shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury ... to prepare and
report estimates of the public revenue, and the public expenditures; to
superintend the collection of the revenue; to decide on the forms of
keeping and stating accounts and making returns."8
Based on this statutory authority, the practice evolved that agencies submitted
annual budget requests to the Treasury, which then recorded each request in
the Book of Estimates. This book included detailed line-item requests from each
agency as well as all revenues received by the Treasury. There was no uniformity
as to how requests were made or how each agency managed existing accounts.59
The Treasury Secretary would simply forward the Book of Estimates to Con-
gress without review, thereby acting as an "agent of transmission."So By 1875,
Congress amended the relevant statutes to reflect this reporting practice.
The piecemeal agency submissions compiled in the Book of Estimates were
a far cry from the comprehensive "statement and account" envisioned by the
Framers. President Taft later described the Book of Estimates as "rather a more
or less well-digested mass of information submitted by agents of the Legislature
57. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the U.S., to Albert Gallatin, Sec'y of
the Treasury (April 1, 1802), in IV JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 47, at 427, 428.
58. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department § 5, 1 Stat. 65, 66 (1789) (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 331). This Act aggregated many of the accounting func-
tions performed by the Continental and Confederation Congresses from 1774-
1789. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1285 (2006).
59. See W.W. Willoughby, Budgetary Procedure in Its Relation to Representative Gov-
ernment, 27 YALE L.J. 741, 750 (1918).
60. Following its compilation by the Treasury, the Book of Estimates was sent to
Congress. Once Congress appropriated funds, the Treasury was responsible for
the auditing and oversight of federal finances to ensure that the uses were con-
sistent with the congressional mandate. See Frederick A. Cleveland, How We've
Been Getting Along Without A Budget, in 9 PROC. AM. POL. SCI. ASS'N 48 (1912).
61. See Act of March 3, 1875 § 3, 18 Stat. 343, 343.
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to the Legislature."16 2 Specifically, the Book of Estimates had two central issues
that persist in federal reporting even today.
First, some government activities funded by public money were simply not
subject to annual reporting. For example, pension costs accounted for more
than fifty percent of the growth in government expenditures following the Civil
War. But since pensions were enacted through private relief bills, they were ex-
cluded from appropriations totals." Hiding these obligations from public scru-
tiny plainly defied the Statement and Account Clause's first purpose: to ensure
accountability through transparency. Even today, certain federal obligations
continue to be excluded from annual reporting through "accounting gimmicks"
embedded in legislative directives.
Second, the Book of Estimates was kept on a cash, not accrual, basis.1 Cash
accounting records revenue when received and spending when paid, whereas ac-
crual accounting records revenue when earned and spending when incurred.">
Simply put, cash accounting "cannot recognize an essential feature of every
credit transaction: the promise to pay cash late.""6 Consider this example:
[A]ssume there is a choice between two ways to solve a problem: one
would cost $40 billion, but would solve the problem for 40 years, and
the other would cost $4 billion, but would solve the problem for only
one year. Under the cash method of accounting, the former would have
a far larger budgetary impact in the immediate year, and so even
though the latter is clearly a less prudent option, lawmakers concerned
either with balancing the budget or with appearing fiscally responsible
to constituents might opt for that course of action . . . an accrual-based
62. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ECONOMY & EFFICIENCY, THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL
BUDGET, at io (1912) [hereinafter TAFT COMMISSION].
63. This refers to the period between 1878 and 1886. See JOHN F. COGAN, TIMOTHY J.
MURIS & ALLEN SCHICK, THE BUDGET PUZZLE: UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL SPENDING
138 n.25 (1994).
64. Willoughby, supra note 59, at 749 ("The statement as to the condition of the
Treasury now submitted to Congress shows little more than the actual cash on
hand. To be adequate, it should be upon an accrual basis, and should clearly ex-
hibit the status of all trust and other special funds, including the funds which each
appropriation creates.").
65. See Lucas & Phaup, supra note 15, at go.
66. See Credit Reform: Comparable Budget Costs for Cash and Credit, CONG. BUDGET
OFF. 5 (1989), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/67xx/
doc6758/89-cbo-o31.pdf. For further information on the failure of government ac-
counting practices in capturing future and contingent liabilities, see Hana Po-
lackova, Government Contingent Liabilities: A Hidden Risk to Fiscal Stability,
WORLD BANK (1998), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/ho.1596/1813-9450-
1989.
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system would accurately reflect the relative financial merits of the two
options."
This problem is exacerbated with respect to loan and insurance programs,
which involve long-term obligations with varying default risks. Dating back to
veterans' benefits following the Revolutionary War, the federal government has
always engaged in financial activities that incurred future liabilities." The Book
of Estimates did little to capture these future (and often large) expenditures.
Therefore, it failed to accurately inform the public and legislators of how public
resources were actually being expended.
In part, this failure can be attributed to the infancy of accounting princi-
ples. "Expenditures were not considered in connection with revenues. Even the
idea of balancing the budget did not exist," explained W.F. Willoughby, a for-
mer Director of the Institute for Government Research and the person often
credited with the 1921 budget reform." Even in the private sector, key account-
ing concepts had not yet developed. 70 Unsophisticated bookkeeping practices
constrained Congress's ability to fully execute its constitutional reporting obli-
gation.
However, the primary reason why a robust reporting system never devel-
oped was that government officials quickly found that publicizing spending de-
67. David Burd & Takeshi Fujitani, FASAB & The Financial Statements of the United
States: Comparing Budget Aggregates to Financial Statements io (Harvard Law
School Fed. Budget Policy Seminar, Briefing Paper No. 13, May 2005),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/FASAB_13.pdf.
68. VA History in BrieJ, DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF. 3, http://www.va.gov/
opa/publications/archives/docs/historyin-brief.pdf ("In 1789, with the ratifica-
tion of the U.S. Constitution, the first Congress assumed the burden of paying
veterans benefits. . . . [They] were administered by the Bureau of Pensions under
the Secretary of War. Subsequent laws included veterans and dependents of the
War of 1812, and extended benefits to dependents and survivors."). On massive
pension programs following the Civil War, see DORA L. COSTA, THE EVOLUTION OF
RETIREMENT: AN AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 1880-1990, at 161-62 (1998). Simi-
larly, nineteenth-century land-development loans such as the Homestead Act of
1862 also involved large future liabilities that were inadequately represented by
cash accounting. See Homestead Act, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
69. W.F. WILLOUGHBY, THE NATIONAL BUDGET SYSTEM 8-9 (1927).
70. The advancement of accounting was driven by judicial protection of British credi-
tors beginning in the 1850s. Sylvia Maxfield, Accounting Paradigm Changes and
Their Impact on Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 4-8 (Int'l Stud-
ies Ass'n Annual Conference, Working Paper W13-15, 2013), http://
www.indiana.edu/-workshop/publications/materials/W13-15.Maxfield.pdf. Prior
to that period, companies recorded "property" and "liabilities." The concept of
carrying costs forward, using a profit and loss account method, laid the founda-
tions for other key innovations such as depreciation. Cf George C. Romeo &
James J. McKinney, Contributions of Joseph Hardcastle to Accounting Theory, 35
ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 145, 146 (20o8) ("During the 19th century, many considered
accounting in the U.K. to be more mature and established than in the U.S.").
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cisions ran contrary to their political interests. Treasury officials, charged with
executing this constitutional duty, intentionally avoided it. In his account of
early administrative agencies, Jerry Mashaw discusses the political disadvantages
of transparency: "Alexander Hamilton learned to his dismay, the reporting re-
quirement in the hands of political opponents could be a prodigious mecha-
nism for harassment."7 ' Like Treasury, Congress also had little incentive to de-
velop a comprehensive accounting system. They had other means of exerting
control over the public fisc and the failure to report lessened political accounta-
bility.72 Therefore, Congress failed to meet the most basic requirements of the
Statement and Account Clause during the nineteenth century with the hetero-
geneous agency submissions collectively known as the Book of Estimates.
B. The Twentieth Century
By the twentieth century, it was clear that the Book of Estimates was not
providing an accurate picture of the government's financial condition." Con-
gress and successive Presidents recognized the need to improve fiscal manage-
ment.7 4 Prompted by the strain of financing World War I, Congress enacted the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and established a unified cash budget for the
government.75 This marked an important step towards fulfilling the Clause's
mandate by producing a comprehensive annual report of all "receipts and ex-
penditures."
71. Mashaw, supra note 58, at 1287.
72. Government finances were also under less scrutiny in the nineteenth century be-
cause federal activities were more limited (except during the Civil War). Federal
expenditures roughly averaged between two and three percent of gross national
product, which meant that individual citizens felt the impact of government fi-
nancial policy less directly. See Christopher Chantrill, US Federal Spending Since
the Founding, U.S. GOv'T SPENDING (July 25, 2013), http://www
.usgovernmentspending.com/federal-spending-chart.
73. The federal government grew dramatically around the turn of the century, which
necessitated the 1921 Act. Between 1884 and 1915, nominal federal spending dou-
bled. SCHICK, supra note 13, at 14. And beginning in 1917, the government under-
took two new types of financing activities: (1) refinancing farm loans following the
agricultural crisis and (2) making loans to railroad companies, which were return-
ing to private ownership after World War I. See generally R.J. SAULNIER ET AL.,
FEDERAL LENDING AND LOAN INSURANCE, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (1958)
(providing a history of federal lending activities).
74. For example, Congress passed the Sundry Civil Appropriation Act of 1909, 35 Stat.
945. A year later, the Taft Commission issued a formal recommendation that the
government, like private companies, should publish a unified budget. TAFT
COMMISSION, supra note 62.
75. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 ch. 18 , 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. § 1101 ); Marren, supra note 4, at part 2.
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The 1921 Act remains the cornerstone of fiscal law today and substantially
improved the reporting process? It tasked the President with formulating a
budget proposal each year. It also created the Bureau of the Budget (today's Of-
fice of Management and Budget) within the Executive Office of the President to
assist with the preparation of an annual budget proposal and determine the
form and contents of the budget's presentation." The Bureau of the Budget be-
gan to standardize public sector accounting practices and used trained govern-
ment employees to ensure consistency across the administrative agencies!8 As a
counterweight to the enhanced executive power, the 1921 Act also established
the GAO, a congressional agency, to audit executive agencies, prescribe ac-
counting standards, and report to Congress. While the GAO is not involved in
producing "a statement and account," its audits create accountability in the re-
porting process.79 This new reporting system moved closer to fulfilling the
Clause's purpose: publishing a report for public consumption that portrayed
government "receipts and expenditures" using standardized accounting
measures.
Nonetheless, the two primary problems-the use of cash accounting and
the exclusion of certain obligations-persisted under the reporting system codi-
fied in the 1921 Act and subsequent statutes. The President's Commission on
Budget Concepts later concluded that government reporting was "confusing to
the public and the Congress and deficient in certain essential characteristics."so
Put simply, federal reporting remained far from compliant with the Statement
and Account Clause's three objectives.
First, certain federal spending vehicles continued to be off-budget. Presi-
dents presented the fiscal activities of the federal government in different ways,
76. See Kenneth Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272,
278-82 (1977) (discussing the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921).
77. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 207. Under President Franklin Roo-
sevelt's Executive Reorganization Plan of 1939, the Bureau of the Budget was
moved from Treasury into the Executive Office of the President itself (as original-
ly proposed by the Taft Commission in 1910). See Exec. Order No. 8248 § 1, 4 Fed.
Reg. 2731, 2731 (June 7, 1939), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C § 901 (2012). This
further strengthened the President's control over the accounting and reporting
processes.
78. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION
OF THE BUDGET, OMB CIRCULAR A-11 (2013) (prescribing accounting standards
and outlining requirements for agency budget submissions), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/asets/anicurent-year/all_2013.pdf.
79. GAO auditing is arguably the most important innovation from the 1921 Act and
should be expanded to improve compliance with the Statement and Account
Clause. See infra Part IV.B.
80. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 6 (Oct. 1967) [hereinafter BUDGET CONCEPTS
REPORT].
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depending on what would be most politically advantageous." New types of
spending-such as trust accounts, federal credit programs, and government-
related entities-remained outside the budget's scope. For example, in Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1935 budget, "trust funds were not even shown in
the same tables as general and special funds as they had been in previous years;
all transactions involving trust accounts were shown separately and given lesser
prominence."" It was not until 1964 that detailed tables-including trust ac-
counts, deposit funds, and certain government-related entities-reappeared in
the President's Budget, albeit on a cash basis.83
Second, reporting continued to be on a cash basis, thereby minimizing fu-
ture obligations of the government.84 Debates over the 1921 Act acknowledge the
deficiencies of cash accounting, but accrual accounting was not included in the
final bill." The distortion caused by cash accounting only increased throughout
the twentieth century. The federal government's extension of credit increased
from less than fifty billion dollars to over five hundred billion dollars between
1964 and 1990.6 Cash-basis accounting was particularly inaccurate for these
programs because loan guarantees appear costless in the year that they are is-
sued, thereby masking large future contingent obligations. While Congress
passed several statutes intended to improve accounting accuracy and standard-
ize presentation, limited progress was made with respect to federal reporting."
81. See id. at 92 tbl.8 (illustrating the variance among annual budget submissions
across Administrations).
82. M. Rodgers & D. Sullivan, Reconsidering the President's Commission on Budget
Concepts of 1967, at 2 (Harvard Law Sch. Fed. Budget Policy Seminar, Briefing Pa-
per No. 30, 20o6), http://www.1aw.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/President
Commission_3o.pdf.
83. Id. at 2-3.
84. As compared to cash accounting, accrual accounting creates a more accurate es-
timate of assets and liabilities at a given point in time, and most scholars agree
that it is superior to cash accounting. Today, the President's Budget continues to
present financial information primarily on a cash basis with the exception of fed-
eral credit programs. See Burd & Fujitani, supra note 67; infra Part III.
85. See Willoughby, supra note 59, at 749.
86. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS F, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1990, at F-2.
87. See, e.g., Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 ch. 946 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3512 (2012)) (establishing the Joint Financial Management
Improvement Program (JFMIP) to centralize financial management); The Ac-
counting and Auditing Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 834 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 3511 (2012)) (requiring the Comptroller General to prescribe accounting stand-
ards for executive agencies).
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Any accounting improvements were effectively offset by new budget gimmicks
that obfuscated spending."
The 1921 Act raised two additional issues that ran counter to the Statement
and Account Clause's principles. First, it effectively consolidated the President's
power over federal reporting, undermining principle two (congressional over-
sight of public funds).9 Although the CBO was created in 1974 to produce an
independent budget analysis and strengthen congressional oversight, the execu-
tive branch retains primary control over the reporting process-directly inter-
acting with agencies and compiling the raw data used by budget agencies. This
executive-led system runs counter to the Framers' second objective of ensuring
congressional oversight of the public fisc.90 Second, the appropriations process
continued to dominate the budget system and overshadow the constitutional
reporting duty. The central purpose of the President's Budget was to serve as a
negotiation document in appropriations battles. It was not aimed at the
Clause's first principle: informing the public and empowering voters with in-
formation in the democratic process.
As a result, federal reporting continued to be non-compliant with the
Statement and Account Clause. President Lyndon Johnson warned, "[t]he tra-
ditional administrative budget is becoming an increasingly less complete and
less reliable measure of the Government's activities and their economic im-
pact."9'
C. Modern Reporting Practices
Today, the United States publishes three annual, ex post accounts of federal
finances: the President's Budget (OMB), the Economic Outlook (CBO), and the
Consolidated Financial Report (Treasury). This reporting regime was enacted
through a series of laws in the 1990s that professionalized federal accounting,
requiring most agencies to submit audited financial statements to OMB.9' They
also redefined how government obligations are recorded, moving certain parts
88. See Block, Budget Gimmicks, in FISCAL CHALLENGES, supra note 6, at39 (describing
how budget gimmicks distort policy choices).
89. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 301-18. Budget scholars characterize
the period between 1921 and 1974 as one of Presidential dominance. See SCHICK,
THE FEDERAL BUDGET, supra note 13.
90. The question of whether Congress improperly delegated its reporting duty has not
been heard by the Court.
91. See Rodgers & Sullivan, supra note 82, at 3 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
BUDGET CONCEPTS: STAFF PAPERS 99 (1967)).
92. CHIEF FIN. OFFICERS COUNCIL & COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY &
EFFICIENCY, THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS ACT OF 1990-20 YEARS LATER: REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS AND THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 3-4 (2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/financial/cfo-act-report.pdf
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of the budget from cash to accrual-like accounting. 93 Budget experts at 0MB,
CBO, Treasury, the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, and federal
agencies continue to make meaningful strides in federal reporting via new regu-
lations or updated practices.
Notwithstanding important improvements in federal reporting, these three
publications continue to suffer from two chief weaknesses: the use of cash-basis
accounting and the off-budget treatment of government-related entities. As de-
scribed in Part II.A, cash accounting substantially understates the government's
expenditures by not recognizing liabilities until actually paid. Although cash ac-
counting is appropriate for certain circumstances, it distorts the financial con-
dition of an entity. Thus, it violates the norm of transparency and accountabil-
ity embodied in principle one. Similarly, excluding certain government-related
entities obviously distorts the federal government's fiscal condition. This vio-
lates all three prongs of the Statement and Account Clause by obfuscating pub-
lic scrutiny, thwarting ongoing congressional oversight, and creating opportu-
nities for abuse. This Section considers each of the three federal reports.
First, the President's Budget is the most well-known report. According to
CBO, it is "the framework generally used by executive branch agencies and the
Congress and . .. commonly discussed in the press."94 Its historical tables pro-
vide a wide range of data on federal government finances dating back to 1940.
However, it continues to account for government liabilities primarily on a cash
basis, which significantly understates future liabilities.95 Where accrual account-
ing is used, market risk is not fully captured.9' While the President's Budget
acknowledges material off-budget activities, such as the Social Security trusts,
the recorded estimates have meaningful flaws due to unreliable data, forecasting
errors, or statutory requirements obscuring certain activities. 97 The data provid-
ed for other off-budget activities is sparse and often qualitative.9'
93. See Burd & Fujitani, supra note 67, at 1-7. Some scholars contend that federal ac-
counting used for lending programs today is not really on an accrual basis because
the government does not use a market-discount rate and assumes no cost of
funds. See, e.g., Lucas & Phaup, supra note 15 (advocating for the use of fair-value
accounting and a market-discount rate in federal budgeting).
94. CONG. BUDGET OFF., CBO's PROJECTIONS OF FEDERAL RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS 1 (2012),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofdes/attachments/os-o9-NIPAs.pdf.
95. See Burd & Fujitani, supra note 67, at 8 ("[Wlhile the federal budget is largely com-
piled under a cash-based method of accounting, it also occasionally employs ac-
crual-based accounting."). One example of this problem is that tax revenue, a sig-
nificant source of federal income, is not subject to accrual accounting. Id. at 7.
96. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
97. See Analytical Perspectives, Chapter 9: Budget Concepts, FY2o4 PRESIDENT'S
BUDGET, at 94-95, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/
fy2015/assets/concepts.pdf [hereinafter Analytical Perspectives FY.20141. On the So-
cial Security Trusts, the President's Budget fails to capture "the 75-year 'open
group unfunded obligation' for the Social Security program which is $9.6 trillion
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Second, the Economic Outlook also includes information on government
finances insofar as it reprints the historical tables listed in the President's Budg-
et. With respect to past obligations, CBO reprints OMB's historical tables under
the theory that monies already spent should be presented on a consistent basis.
With respect to current and future activities, CBO uses accrual accounting. This
practice also creates a discrepancy within the Economic Outlook: it presents fu-
ture liabilities on an accrual basis, but records past obligations on a cash basis.
Therefore, this report has limited utility as an ex post account of government
"receipts and expenditures."
Third, the CFR is the most comprehensive report on federal financial activ-
ities. It accounts for the government's operations on an accrual basis, thereby
recognizing costs when incurred but not necessarily paid (although it does not
apply market-discount rates).99 It also recognizes a broader range of govern-
ment liabilities than other reports. For example, Appendix A contains a list of
121 government-related entities (GREs) that have significant contingent liabili-
ties (e.g., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Thrift Savings Fund, and the Federal Re-
serve System, among others).oo But only thirty-five of these entities are consoli-
dated into the budget totals, and GAO has expressed concerns about the
integrity of Treasury's analysis.o' Partially due to material accounting issues at
(in present value terms)." DAWN NUSCHLER & GARY SIDOR, CONG. RESEARCH
SERv., RL33028, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE TRUST FUND 12 n.29 (June 4, 2013),
http://www.fas.org/sgplcrs/misc/RL33o28.pdf.
98. See Analytical Perspectives FY 2014, supra note 97, at 94-95.
99. Financial Report of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 6
(2013), https://www.fms.treas.gov/frsummary/FR-Summary-2013.pdf [hereinafter
FY2oi3 Consolidated Financial Report]. Tax revenue is recognized on a modified
cash basis. Id. at 6. A CBO study notes that by assuming no cost of funds, the CFR
understates the total budget liabilities and skews budget data:
[I] gnoring the cost of risk understates the federal cost of credit assistance,
potentially biasing the allocation of budgetary resources. For example,
excluding the cost of risk from budget and program decisions may mis-
lead policymakers by suggesting that some federal credit programs pro-
vide financial resources to the government at no cost to taxpayers. It also
encourages reliance on credit rather than other policies that might be
more efficient in achieving particular goals.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF SUBSIDIES FOR FEDERAL LOANS
AND LOAN GUARANTEES 2-3 (2004).
100. FY2oi3 Consolidated Financial Report, supra note 99, at 52 ("Certain entities are
excluded from the Financial Report because they are Government-Sponsored En-
terprises (GSE), such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), or their activi-
ties are not included in the Federal budget, such as the Thrift Savings Fund and
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.").
101. See i TREASURY FINANCIAL MANUAL pt. 2, ch. 4700 (2013) (providing an explana-
tion of why the Treasury includes 35 of the 121 GREs in its aggregate analysis); U.S.
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the Department of Defense and the incomplete treatment of the Social Security
Trusts, GAO concluded that the CFR presents "significant issues regarding the
reliability and presentation of the federal government's financial infor-
mation.""o2
Finally, it is worth noting that all three reports often produce different re-
sults, even when adjusted for format and timing.o3 GAO reports suggest that
data discrepancies result from technical issues with intra-governmental ac-
counting.1o4 In many cases, budget experts struggle to explain how the historical
data in each report relate and why discrepancies occur.' Although federal
budget actors continue to make substantial improvements to data collection,
resource forecasting, and financial reporting, more work remains.
While accounting is an imperfect science and risk-assessment techniques
continue to evolve, scholars widely acknowledge that public accounting is "light
years behind accounting in the private sector."'o Some argue that federal re-
porting by the government differs from financial accounting by private compa-
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-752T, FINANCIAL AND PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT: MORE RELIABLE AND COMPLETE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ADDRESS
FEDERAL MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL CHALLENGES 11 (2013) [hereinafter GAO
RELIABILITY REPORT].
102. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o9-946SP, UNDERSTANDING THE
PRIMARY COMPONENTS OF THE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT i (2009). Most recently, a July 2013 GAO report questioned the
CFR's estimates for social insurance-related liabilities, which comprise $27.2 tril-
lion (or 70.5 percent) of the federal government's reported future expenditures.
GAO RELIABILITY REPORT, supra note ioi, at 13 n.29; see Howell E. Jackson, Ac-
counting for Social Security and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 149 (2004)
(discussing FASAB's decision to only partially represent the future liabilities asso-
ciated with the Social Security trusts).
103. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-319R, U.S. GOVERNMENT'S 2013 AND
2012 CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2-3 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/670/661234.pdf [hereinafter GAO CFR ANALYSIS 2012-2013]. All three reports
draw their information from the same account-level data annually requested from
the agencies by OMB and maintained by Treasury's FMS.
104. GAO RELIABILITY REPORT, supra note ioi, at 4. On difficulties estimating costs, see
OMB Cir. No. A-11, supra note 78, § 185.6 (discussing re-estimation procedures).
On difficulties calculating interest rates, see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-o5-409, SBA DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM: ACCOUNTING ANOMALIES RESOLVED
BUT ADDITIONAL STEPS WOULD IMPROVE LONG-TERM RELIABILITY OF COST
ESTIMATES2-3 (2005).
105. On the imprecision of federal reporting, see Louis Fisher, President Budgetary Du-
ties, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 754-90 (2012); and Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-
Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1995). See also ALLEN SCHICK,
THE CAPACITY TO BUDGET 7-8 (1990) (discussing the limits of budgeting tools in
creating political accountability and reducing federal deficits).
106. Lucas & Phaup, supra note 15.
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nies because it is not only an internal planning tool, but also "one of the princi-
pal means of communicating with citizens."1 o7 If anything, this communicative
function warrants more, not less, precise reporting. Nonetheless, federal report-
ing continues to fall short of the Statement and Account Clause's three purpos-
es. The result is that federal programs appear to cost taxpayers less, meaningful-
ly distorting public understanding of how resources are being used and
frustrating efforts to achieve fiscal responsibility.
III. MODERN VIOLATIONS
Looking beyond the flaws of typical reporting processes, this Part offers two
specific examples of policy choices that explicitly defy the Statement and Ac-
count Clause's "most pointed directions."" It also sheds light on a tension aris-
ing from the Clause itself. Indeed, the congressional mandate to lay bare all
spending runs counter to Congress's political interests to obscure spending
which would be unpopular with the electorate and could be used by its political
opponents.'09 Two examples illustrate how Congress's decision to place pro-
grams outside typical reporting processes contravenes the Statement and Ac-
count Clause: the treatment of federal insurance programs (FIPs)no and gov-
ernment-related entities (GREs)."' They compound the reporting weaknesses
107. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 259 (2d ed.,
2000).
108. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 459.
109. Former FASAB Chairman David Mosso has noted that "[t]ax expenditures are a
politician's dream because once enacted they are invisible, perpetual, not subject
to annual appropriations committee scrutiny and... [make] the government
look smaller than it is. Those same characteristics make them an accountability
nightmare, probably the preeminent form of financial obfuscation." See Mosso,
supra note 6, at 7. Budget actors also have an incentive to avoid annual risk as-
sessments for complex, specialized entities given their limited resources and time.
Budget agencies have repeatedly testified to Congress about the difficulties arising
from more rigorous statutory requirements. On the difficulties involved with
measuring future government liabilities, see David B. Pariser, Implementing Fed-
eral Credit Reform: Challenges Facing Public Sector Financial Managers, 12 PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN. 19, 28 (1992).
110. In April 2013, FASAB issued an exposure draft to institutionalize the practice of
excluding the GREs and the Federal Reserve from federal reporting. This pro-
posed rule would codify accounting practices in tension with the Statement and
Account Clause's mandate. See sources cited supra note ii; see also Robin
Goldwyn Blumenthal, Auditors Wanted: Federal Numbers Game?, BARRON'S
ONLINE (Aug. 17, 2013), http://online.barrons.com/article/SB5ooo142405274
8704148304579017910119363596.html.
111. GREs, as used herein, refer to a broader category of entities than those included in
the statutory definitions, such as "government corporations" and government
controlled corporations. See 31 U.S.C. § 9101(2) (2012)) (identifying specific
mixed-ownership government corporations); 2 U.S.C. § 622(8) (2012) (identifying
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described in the prior Part and materially distort any "statement and account"
of the government's overall fiscal condition by excluding four trillion dollars of
potential "expenditures."
A. Understating Federal Insurance Programs
The first obvious violation is the treatment of federal insurance programs-
both the presentation of federal insurance programs on a cash basis and the ex-
clusion of "independent" insurance programs entirely. This practice frustrates
all three principles embodied in the Statement and Account Clause: it under-
mines transparency and accountability regarding the size of insurance expendi-
tures; it minimizes congressional oversight of how insurance is administered;
and it increases the potential for corruption within these programs. And the
impact is significant. Federal insurance programs present large future liabilities
that often cover high-risk areas or populations that cannot access insurance
through private market mechanisms.
First, there is strong evidence that issues with cash accounting are more
acute with respect to insurance liabilities that depend on actuarial projections of
future losses.n2 GAO has stated that "cash-based budgeting for federal insurance
programs may provide neither the information nor incentives necessary to sig-
nal emerging problems, make adequate cost comparisons, control costs, or en-
sure the availability of resources to pay future claims.""' Misrepresenting insur-
ance programs has material consequences and impacts other resource allocation
decisions. The Center on Federal Financial Institutions estimates that "the fed-
eral government insure[s] against property, liability, or credit losses of more
than $7 trillion in potential payouts in a worst-case scenario."" 4
entities "that operate under Federal charters for the purpose of enhancing credit,"
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
112. See The Budgetary Treatment of Subsidies in the National Flood Insurance Program:
Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Jan.
25, 2006) http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files
.View&FileStore_id= ebc900f4-dd2o-4af7-ad5f-2c3619681760 (testimony of Donald
B. Marron, Acting Director of Cong. Budget Office) (providing a comprehensive
analysis of issues associated with cash accounting for federal insurance programs
and highlighting the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in particular).
113. Budgeting for Federal Insurance Programs: Testimony Before the H. Comm. on
Budget 51 (April 23, 1998), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T
-AIMD-98-147/pdf/GAOREPORTS-T-AIMD-98-147.pdf [hereinafter Irving Tes-
timony], (testimony of Susan Irving, Assoc. Dir., Cong. Budget Office),
114. Federal Insurance Programs, CENTER FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONs, http://www.coffi
.org/ins-progs.html (last visited April 27, 2014) (discussing various estimates of
federal insurance programs liabilities). By way of example, recent losses incurred
by the NFIP forced Congress to increase NFIP's borrowing authority by an addi-
tional $9.7 billion to cover new claims. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
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Notwithstanding this evidence, Congress continues to reject proposals to
extend accrual accounting to insurance programs." 5 In fact, due to concerns
about agency capacity, insurance programs were explicitly excluded from ac-
crual accounting under section 506 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act."6 Budget
agencies have repeatedly testified that quantifying potential liabilities would be
difficult since "[olften, historical data are unavailable, frequent program modi-
fications occur, and fundamental changes take place in the activities insured." 7
But private insurance companies regularly publish risk analyses, showing that
this task is worthy of pursuit.
The implications of these omissions are significant. For example, the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which insures single- and multi-
employer defined benefit plans, is not shown on an accrual basis even though
its "liabilities exceeded its assets by about $36 billion.""' The CFR warns about
PBGC's potential liabilities, but does not depict them. GAO highlights that the
actual and potential costs of insurance programs are so significant that omitting
these liabilities is materially misleading."9
B. Treatment of Government-Related Entities
The second violation of the Clause is the exclusion of most government-
related entities (GREs) from the three annual reports. While certain accounting
GAO-13-283, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 261 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/66o/652133.pdf (noting the inadequate financial management and oversight
where premiums were dramatically below market rates). For media coverage, see
Tom Curry, As Storms Rage, Clouds Loom Over National Flood Insurance Program,
NBC NEwS, June 13, 2013, http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/
2013/o6/13/18938501-as-storms-rage-clouds-loom-over-federal-flood-insurance-
program?lite.
115. JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42632, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF
FEDERAL CREDIT (DIRECT LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES): CONCEPTS, HISTORY,
AND ISSUES FOR THE 112TH CONGRESS 13-14 (2012) (discussing why past proposals
have failed, the need for reporting reform, and the content of current reform pro-
posals). See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFMD-89-42, BUDGET
ISSUES: BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS 28 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter GAO BUDGET ISSUES].
116. 2 U.S.C. § 661e(a) (2006).
117. BICKLEY, supra note 115, at 12-13 (discussing budget agency concerns with moving
to accrual accounting for insurance programs). As then GAO Associate Director
for Budget Issues, Susan Irving, testified in April 1998, "the complexity of the is-
sues involved . .. suggest that it is not feasible to integrate accrual based costs di-
rectly into the budget at this time." Irving Testimony, supra note 113, at 13.
118. See GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-319R, U.S. GOVERNMENT'S 2013 AND
2012 CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 5 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/670/661234.pdf [hereinafter GAO CFR ANALYSIS 2012-20131.
119. Id.
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practices have minimal impact on a budget as large as that of the federal gov-
ernment's, the presentation of GREs materially distorts modern reporting. To-
day, "an increasing portion of the government's business is being done outside
the traditional structure."' The National Academy of Public Administration
(itself a GRE) similarly writes, "[t]he boundary between the public and private
sectors has been blurred so that one cannot say with assurance to which sector
many corporations belong or to whom they are accountable."' 2
To date, budget entities have struggled to establish a satisfying conceptual
framework to capture GREs due to their broad range of ties to the government.
In 2008, GAO added a new section to its Red Book, entitled "The Problem of
Definition," that addresses this challenge:
The lack of a uniform, governmentwide statutory definition is not the
only complication. . . . Even when Congress has been quite specific in
declaring that a corporation is not a federal instrumentality, it may still
take on that status for constitutional purposes. 22
The fact that the government's relationship to and responsibility for GREs is
not well defined makes measuring the "expenditures" associated with GREs ex-
traordinarily difficult. 1
In addition to the practical challenges, the contingent nature of these "ex-
penditures" poses a conceptual challenge. According to international account-
ing standards, contingent liabilities are obligations triggered by a condition or
event that may or may not occur.2 4 For example, a natural disaster or banking
120. 3 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o8-978SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 15-87 (3d ed. 2008), http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/
do8978sp.pdf [hereinafter 3 GAO REDBOOK]. This trend has been widely com-
mented on by budget scholars. See, e.g., THOMAS STANTON, GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: MERCANTILIST COMPANIES IN THE MODERN WORLD
(2002) (providing a robust description of "government instrumentalities" which
he defines as non-government entities that represent contingent liabilities and
perform core state functions).
121. 3 GAO RED BOOK, supra note 120, at 15-87 to 15-88 (internal citations omitted).
122. Id. at 15-67.
123. The FDIC is one example of an entity where there are significant difficulties asso-
ciated with identifying and estimating potential liabilities. Since the FDIC insures
the entire U.S. banking system, it has potential liabilities of roughly seven billion
dollars in the event of a systemic crisis. Of course, this tail scenario overstates the
potential liability. But the federal budget shows zero cost to taxpayers, which vast-
ly understates the liabilities. After the savings and loan crisis, the FDIC required
additional borrowing capacity to stay solvent under the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICI). See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006). For more in-
formation, see A Brief History of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the
United States, FDIC Div. RES. & STAT. 54-55 (1998), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
historical/brieflbrhist.pdf.
124. Hana Polackova, Contingent Government Liabilities: A Hidden Risk for Fiscal Sta-
bility, at 2 n.2 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1989, 1998).
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crisis is an exogenous condition that would result in future government outlays.
Similarly, underpriced government programs (e.g., single-family mortgages,
small business loans, flood insurance) or poor regulatory supervision could also
result in future government expenditures. As Hana Polackova of the World
Bank explains, "[t]he probability of the contingency occurring and the magni-
tude of the government outlay required to settle the ensuing obligation are dif-
ficult to forecast.""2 5 The federal government already recognizes certain contin-
gent liabilities with respect to its own programs. It uses financial models to
predict future obligations, albeit with varying degrees of accuracy. 6 Generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) similarly require the recognition of cer-
tain contingent liabilities for public companies.
With respect to GREs, the government has no explicit obligation to settle
future liabilities under a particular law or contract. But it is widely acknowl-
edged by lawmakers and creditors that the government will stand behind the
GREs in times of stress. In other words, there is an implicit obligation based on
"public expectations, political pressures, and the overall role of the state as soci-
ety understands it."'7 Contingent liabilities of the GREs, though technically off-
budget, will ultimately be borne by the taxpayer. GAO warns that these entities
could affect the government's long-term fiscal soundness.12
Two examples demonstrate why GREs should be included in typical report-
ing processes on an accrual basis. First, the United States Postal Service (USPS)
has significant actual and potential liabilities, including two lines of credit to the
Federal Financing Bank. By statute, it can borrow up to $15 billion, of which
roughly $n billion is currently drawn. 9 There is a substantial risk that the gov-
ernment will not be paid back and USPS will require further assistance given its
tenuous financial condition.3 o But since Congress designated USPS an inde-
pendent corporation per 39 U.S.C. § 201, it is only mentioned in the appendices
and not included in budget totals. Second, the National Consumer Cooperative
Bank (NCCB) is a private enterprise that was chartered by Congress in 1978.'31
125. Id. at 2.
126. In addition to the government's resource and technology constraints, its pro-
grams often lack comparable historical data. The government often serves areas
and populations that do not attract private sector investment for the very reason
that the risk is potentially high and difficult to predict.
127. Polackova, supra note 124, at 2.
128. GAO CFR ANALYSIS2012-2013,supra note n8, at 5.
129. See FEDERAL FINANCING BANK, Management's Discussion and Analysis September
30, 2o3 and 2012, US. DEPT' TREASURY 3, http://www.treasury.gov/ffb/financial-
statements/FFB22013_2012%2oFinancial%2oReports.pdf (stating that the USPS has
total borrowing authority of $15 billion by statute).
130. See KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41o24, THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE'S
FINANCIAL CONDITION: A PRIMER 2 (July 2013).
131. 12 U.S.C. § 31 (2012); see U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-63,
NATIONAL CONSUMER COOPERATIVE BANK: OVERSIGHT ADEQUATE BUT FEDERAL
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The federal government owns roughly $184 million of its debt which comes due
in 2020.132 Like USPS, its financial condition suggests that repayment is unlike-
ly.'33 Nonetheless, NCCB is not named, not even in the appendices. 34 These are
just two of the hundreds of GREs that have actual and contingent liabilities for
which the federal government is responsible, but are intentionally kept outside
of typical reporting processes.'
Federal housing programs provide the most well known example of these
problems. Despite the fact that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac required a bailout
during the recent financial crisis, federal reporting continues to ignore the cred-
it risks associated with these entities. In fact, the reality is just the opposite: be-
cause the Treasury Department owns stock in the entities, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac appear to generate revenue for taxpayers.13'6 Thus, these entities vi-
olate the transparency and accountability norms embodied in the Statement
and Account Clause. The need for better public reporting is acute.
LOAN REPAYMENT NEEDS MONITORING 1-3 (1995), http://gao.gov/
assets/230/22o866.pdf [hereinafter NCCB, OVERSIGHT ADEQUATE].
132. See Thomas Kim, Security & Exchange Commission "No Action" Letter (Dec. 14,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/20n/nccboo311-2al
-incoming.pdf
133. SeeNCCB, OVERSIGHT ADEQUATE, supra note 131, at 3.
134. See FY2013 CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at app. A.
135. It is worth noting that proponents of excluding the GREs from the government's
consolidated reporting argue that "the federal government has no legal responsi-
bility to 'bail out' GSEs." BiCKLEY, supra note 115, at 13. However, in many cases,
the government already has outstanding financial liabilities with GREs (as the ex-
amples above demonstrate).
136. It is possible that the bailout will ultimately impose no cost on taxpayers and even
reduce the long-term deficit by several hundred billion dollars. See Phillip Swagel,
Proposal 13: Increasing the Role of the Private Sector in Housing Finance, HAMILTON
PROJECT 76-83 (2013), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads-and_
links/THP_15WaysRethinkFedDeficitF2 2.pdf. But significant credit risk re-
mains on their roughly four trillion dollar portfolio. Professors Deborah Lucas
and Marvin Phaup explain that "[tlhe imperative to address (current budget] is-
sues is heightened by the federal government's recent assumption of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac .... Going forward this would have a significantly positive effect
on the budget surplus each year, and the riskier their book of new business, the
greater would be the savings. We hope that this stunning example of the perverse
effects of the current accounting treatment of credit risk will serve as an impetus
for change." Lucas & Phaup, supra note i, at 107. In addition to their placement
in appendices, it is worth noting the large discrepancies in federal reporting. The
President's Budget for fiscal year 2014 estimates, for example, are $134 billion low-
er than CBO's projections. The size of this discrepancy reflects OMB's use of cash
accounting. See An Analysis of The President's 2014 Budget, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE
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Significantly, for the first time, the President's Budget for fiscal year 2013
added a table that aggregated the net outstanding lending and borrowing of the
largest GREs. 7 The CFR also lists by name 119 GREs and includes 35 of those
entities in its analysis.138
IV. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
These substantial reporting issues reduce the quality of information with
which citizens evaluate their elected representatives, potentially hampering the
democratic process. They also obfuscate the use of off-budget spending-which
has ballooned to over four trillion dollars over the past century' 39-and hamper
any efforts towards fiscal responsibility. Particularly today, in a period of lim-
ited resources and heightened attention to fiscal responsibility, it is important
that both Congress and the citizenry have complete and accurate information
about the government's "receipts and expenditures." 4o Without accurate in-
formation, Congress cannot address the fiscal issues for which it has responsi-
bility.
The question thus arises how the Statement and Account Clause can be en-
forced against the budget agencies, and, when appropriate, against Congress. At
the time of the state debates over ratification of the Constitution, at least some
people believed that the public would have a means of redress under the State-
ment and Account Clause. 4' This Part first considers the limited jurisprudence
on this Clause. Since the judiciary has been hesitant to intervene in reporting
disputes, Congress itself must create procedures to bring annual reporting into
137. See Analytical Perspectives, Chapter 9: Budget Concepts, FY2013 PRESIDENT'S
BUDGET, at 412-13 tbl.23-1o, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-
2013PER/pdf/BUDGET-2013-PER.pdf.
138. See FY2o3 Consolidated Financial Report, supra note 99, at 212-13 app. A.
139. See DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, UNCLE SAM IN PINSTRIPES: EVALUATING U.S. FEDERAL
CREDIT PROGRAMS 3 (2011) (estimating taxpayers bear the risk for eight trillion
dollars in federal loan and guarantees in FY2olo); Jackson, supra note 6, at 2 (es-
timating that government liabilities exceed budget by $3.3 trillion in fiscal year
2005).
140. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 201 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The mandate runs to the Congress and to the agencies it creates to make 'a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money.' The beneficiary-as is abundantly clear from the constitutional history-
is the public. The public cannot intelligently know how to exercise the franchise
unless it has a basic knowledge concerning at least the generality of the accounts
under every head of government.")
141. See supra Part I. By design, the reporting requirement provides information to
voters so they can exercise their rights as citizens and therefore is germane to the
democratic process.
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greater compliance with the Clause's mandate.142 I conclude that Congress
should expand GAO's powers to interpret, monitor, and enforce compliance
with the Statement and Account Clause. This is one way to improve federal re-
porting and bring renewed attention to the Clause's mandate.
A. The Role of the Judiciary
Only a few Supreme Court decisions have mentioned the Statement and
Account Clause and, to date, not one has recognized a citizen's right to hold
Congress responsible under this Clause. 43 This Section surveys the limited ju-
risprudence and concludes that any judicial challenge to the adequacy of Con-
gress's reporting processes is, as Kate Stith has predicted, "doomed."' 4 Conse-
quently, other institutional mechanisms should be developed to improve
compliance with this affirmative reporting duty.
The earliest case related to the Statement and Account Clause is Hart's Case
(1880), in which the Court established that Congress has the absolute power to
define and execute its duties in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7.145 The case does
not directly mention the Statement and Account Clause, but later cases have re-
lied on this opinion to establish that Congress has complete discretion to design
budget processes and delegate power to institutional actors."46
142. This idea that enforcement responsibility ought to lie with Congress itself, not the
judiciary, echoes Professor Stith's argument regarding the appropriation power.
See Stith, supra note 3, at 1386 (noting that "Congress itself must identify institu-
tions and procedures to vindicate its constitutional power of the purse").
143. The Court has declined to reach a conclusion on the merits, stating that the plain-
tiffs lack standing to bring suit. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 166. As a result,
the political process is the primary means of redress.
144. Stith, supra note 3, at 1392.
145. Hart's Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880), aff'd sub. nom Hart v. United States, 118 U.S.
62 (1886) ("Auditing and accounting are but parts of a scheme for payment...
absolute control of the moneys of the United States is in Congress, and Congress
is responsible for its exercise of this great power only to the people."). In Hart's
Case, it is worth noting that the Court actually qualifies the view that Congress has
"absolute control" of "auditing and accounting" by saying that Congress is ulti-
mately responsible to the people in the way in which it exercises this control. This
important qualification is often overlooked by scholars and later cases citing this
opinion.
146. Congress's "absolute" discretion with respect to spending legislation should be
distinguished from its authority with respect to reporting standards. The Appro-
priations Clause gives Congress considerable authority to enact backdoor spend-
ing (for example, off-balance-sheet vehicles such as trust funds) so long as Con-
gress clearly defines the terms of funding. In contrast, the Statement and Account
Clause contemplates no exemptions to the requirement of transparency. So while
Congress has authority to prescribe accounting forms and delegate reporting du-
ties, exempting "receipts or expenditures" from the reporting requirement runs
counter to the constitutional mandate. In addition, the judiciary has recognized
536
32:505 2014
THE STATEMENT AND ACCOUNT CLAUSE
Almost one hundred years later, in the only Supreme Court case brought
under the Statement and Account Clause, the Court affirmed Congress's abso-
lute fiscal authority.47 In United States v. Richardson, a private citizen alleged
that the provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (CIA Act) ex-
empting activities of the CIA from federal reporting requirements violated the
public reporting obligation under the Statement and Account Clause.* The
Court dismissed the suit for lack of standing in a five-to-four ruling.'49 Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion reiterated that Congress has absolute power to
define the scope and requirements of the Statement and Account Clause.'
Three years later, Michael Harrington attempted to circumvent the Court's
ruling by challenging the CIA Act in his capacity as a Congressman. In Harring-
limits on Congress's power of the purse. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987) (addressing Congress's ability to impose conditions on the use of feder-
al grants and noting that actions taken must not be prohibited by the Constitu-
tion).
147. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.11 (1974) (describing the plaintiffs
claim that the provision of the CIA Act exempting activities of the CIA from fed-
eral reporting requirements is unconstitutional under the Statement and Account
Clause); see Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 154-62 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that the
Statement and Account Clause does not create a judicially enforceable standard to
require the disclosure of intelligence spending).
148. The United States Code provides different accounting and reporting requirements
for the CIA. 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (20o6). National-security exemptions have been
adjudicated in several cases. This Note does not opine on the persuasiveness of
these arguments, except to point out that the Framers did not contemplate na-
tional-security exceptions, as discussed in Part I.
149. By avoiding the political question doctrine, the Court issued a less definitive
statement on the justiciability of the Clause and left open the possibility that a fu-
ture plaintiff could satisfy the standing requirements. In other areas of the law, the
Court has taken a permissive view of standing doctrine (for example, allowing
third-party claims in jury-selection matters). See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights,
and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2020 (1998).
150. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 178 n.11. Justice Stewart dissented, joined by Justice
Marshall, reiterating that the reporting obligation is an affirmative congressional
duty that any citizen should be able to challenge in court. Id. at 202 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent explained that "the violations caused [Rich-
ardson] injury not only in respect of his right as a citizen to know how Congress
was spending the public fisc, but also in respect of his right as a voter to receive
information to aid his decision how and for whom to vote. These claims may ul-
timately fail on the merits, but Richardson has 'standing' to assert them." Id. at
237 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 2o8, 236 (1974). In the lower court opinion, Judge Rosenn argued
that the "obvious design" of the clause is to provide voters with information and
the clause embodies "the core of public accountability in a democratic society."
Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 166
(1974).
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ton v. Bush (1976), Harrington argued that his "lack of information [on national
security spending] impairs the quality of his participation in the appropriations
process and thus constitutes a significant injury to him in his capacity as a Con-
gressman."15' The D.C. Circuit dismissed the suit and reiterated Congress's au-
thority over fiscal reporting. 52
Several litigation strategies have yet to be tested. No case has directly chal-
lenged the adequacy of typical reporting processes (only the denial of financial
information upon a citizen's request). Nor has any case questioned Congress's
authority to delegate its reporting duty to the executive branch or budget agen-
cies.'53 One could also imagine a litigant invoking "voter standing" to demand
more comprehensive reporting of government finances.'54 The mere fact that a
151. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
152. The majority noted that, "[slince Congressional power is plenary with respect to
the definition of the appropriations process and reporting requirements, the legis-
lature is free to establish exceptions to this general framework." Id. at 194-95. But
unlike the Richardson opinion where the taxpayer failed to state a particular griev-
ance, the Court denied standing in Harrington because the Congressman had al-
ternative means of finding financial information. Id. The D.C. Circuit addressed a
similar suit four years later in Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
A citizen sought access to CIA documents describing legal bills and fee arrange-
ments with private attorneys, claiming that Exemption 3 of the Freedom of In-
formation Act (FIOA) violated the Statement and Account Clause. The D.C. Cir-
cuit dismissed the case for lack of standing. There is also a line of cases related to
statutory grants of transparency under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
See, e.g., Aftergood v. CIA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 557, 560 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that
the CIA cannot deny requests for historical budget information because Congress
has not provided an exemption applicable to the requested documents). However,
the FOIA is fundamentally different in that it places the burden on the public to
request information. By contrast, the Statement and Account Clause provides a
positive obligation (e.g., an affirmative obligation to provide information to the
public).
153. Congress originally delegated the reporting duty to the Treasury Department,
which was "functionally a part of the Congress" at the time of that delegation.
Mashaw, supra note 58, at 1286. Only later did Treasury become part of the execu-
tive branch, thereby moving this congressional duty into the President's purview.
Id. The creation of FASAB in the 1990s through a memorandum of understanding
among the budget agencies further complicates the delegation question. See Mar-
ren, supra note 4, at part 3. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), is the foundational case regarding non-delegation doctrine. The issue in
that case was whether Congress could delegate regulation of the poultry industry
to the President under the Commerce Clause. There have been several cases ad-
dressing Congress's authority to delegate its fiscal responsibilities to agencies. See,
e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down the deficit-limit provi-
sion of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that vested power in the GAO Comp-
troller).
154. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998).
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constitutional provision has lain dormant in our nation's history does not mean
that it could never be adjudicated should the appropriate controversy arise.
But even if the courts choose to intervene, judicial restraint would dictate,
at least in the first instance, directing Congress to fashion a remedy. Absent
conflict between Congress and the executive branch, the courts have a strong
incentive to invoke canons of constitutional avoidance.' And federal courts
have good reason to be cautious about exercising power in this area: state courts
have encountered considerable difficulties enforcing balanced-budget provi-
sions and other fiscal requirements.15 Furthermore, judicial enforcement might
not be the most effective means of ensuring compliance. Courts do not have the
expertise to evaluate accounting standards or to prescribe forms of presentation
for "receipts and expenditures." Particularly given the complicated and unique
relationship of different entities to the government, and the numerous account-
ing and economic issues involved, technical knowledge may be required. 57 The
right to information on federal spending may be an area where the courts can-
not provide judicial protection-what Professor Larry Sager calls an "underen-
forced constitutional norm."'>8 Therefore, the judiciary should only be consid-
ered a last resort if other enforcement mechanisms fail.
B. Expanded GAO Oversight
Enforcing the Statement and Account Clause therefore poses a distinctive
challenge. Standing issues and the political question doctrine make judicial in-
tervention unlikely. And voluntary legislative compliance is equally improbable
since it is against Congress's interest to expose spending choices to public scru-
tiny. So how can the government improve compliance with the Statement and
Account Clause and provide a more accurate picture of the government's fiscal
condition?
155. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 70, 129 (1962).
156. For an overview of the challenges that state courts have faced enforcing fiscal pro-
visions, see Richard Briffault, Courts, Constitutions, and Public Finance: Some Re-
cent Experiences from the States, in FISCAL CHALLENGES, supra note 6, at 418 (dis-
cussing the Fifth Amendment and anti-confiscatory provisions as evidence that
the judiciary cannot bind the spending decisions of future Congresses); and John
Harrison, New Property, Entrenchment, and the Fiscal Constitution, in FISCAL
CHALLENGES, supra note 6, at 401 (Garrett et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that judicial
efforts to enforce balanced budget provisions have had mixed results).
157. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Consti-
tutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (discussing limitations on the judici-
ary's role in enforcing constitutional norms, specifically citing judicial competen-
cy concerns).
158. Id. at 1213.
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Several mechanisms already exist to interpret principles of fiscal law, such
as opinions by the Attorney General and Comptroller General.159 For example,
GAO is required to issue reports on government accounting practices and high-
light reporting concerns about particular programs to Congress.6 o Although
these opinions do not have the authority of judicial decisions, they do have
"great practical force in providing rules of operation for administrative offic-
ers."'61 Therefore, these institutional bodies provide an obvious vehicle through
which to enforce the Statement and Account Clause.
This Section suggests that Congress should empower the GAO to audit any
government-related entity and issue binding opinions against reporting entities.
In addition, GAO auditors should be embedded within agencies like inspectors
general (IG) or financial-compliance officers. This would require legislative ac-
tion to accomplish. While expanding GAO's authorities does not prevent Con-
gress from enacting new laws that frustrate the Statement and Account Clause's
mandate, it would improve the quality of information being assembled by
budget actors and agencies. But once authority was delegated, GAO would be
charged with actively overseeing compliance with the Statement and Account
Clause's mandate-an improvement upon the status quo.
This idea is not without precedent. Several scholars have argued that GAO,
led by the Comptroller General, is uniquely well situated to interpret fiscal laws,
monitor agency compliance, and resolve disputes.162 First, the Comptroller
General is not answerable to either Congress or the executive branch. This in-
dependence makes GAO unique among budget agencies.'' Second, the Comp-
troller General is already empowered to review and audit executive, legislative,
159. The Attorney General's authority is derived from 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-12 (2012), and
the Comptroller General's authority is drawn from 31 U.S.C. § 3526 (2012). In ad-
dition, OMB also plays a significant role in developing reporting norms. See, e.g.,
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB CIRCULAR No. A-i, PREPARATION, SUBMIssIoN
AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2003).
160. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 683-85 (2012).
161. Stith, supra note 3, at 1388. The non-binding nature of Comptroller General deci-
sions has an important exception: decisions related to settling government ac-
counts are binding on the executive branch. Id. But the Comptroller General has
no power to enforce these decisions. Congress itself, through oversight commit-
tees or denying future appropriation requests, provides the only means of re-
course today. See Kevin T. Abikoff, The Role of the Comptroller General in Light of
Bowsher v. Synar, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1539, 1540 (1987).
162. See, e.g., FREDERICK C. MOSHER, THE GAO: THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 158 (1979) (noting that all Comptrollers General have
"treasured and defended the independence of their office, not alone from the
President but also from Congress itself"); Stith, supra note 3, at 1389 (characteriz-
ing the Comptroller General as "uniquely independent").
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and judicial agencies. 6 4 It can also prescribe accounting principles in consulta-
tion with the President and Secretary of the Treasury.' 5 Third, GAO's determi-
nations have historically carried significant weight with the executive branch
and received substantial deference from the judiciary (at least in the context of
appropriations law).' 6 It is arguable that the oversight duties of GAO already
operate as one way-albeit a weak one-through which Congress attempts to
implement its reporting duty.
But GAO's current authority is limited in certain key respects, particularly
since the Supreme Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar (1986).'"7 In Bowsher,
the Court held that the Comptroller General may not play an enforcement role
by bringing suit under the Impoundment Control Act.' This also called into
question GAO's subpoena powers. In addition, GAO's authority to audit agen-
cies does not apply to all agencies-leaving many government-related enter-
prises and independent federal insurance programs outside of its purview.6 *
Therefore, for GAO to act as an effective enforcement mechanism with re-
spect to the Statement and Account Clause and to provide a more accurate pic-
ture of the government's financial position, Congress must further empower
GAO to audit all government-related entities and render binding opinions
against the reporting agencies.c'o The power to render binding opinions is par-
164. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 716-17 (2012) (investing GAO with the authority to investigate
and analyze expenditures of public funds); 31 U.S.C. § 3523(a) (2012) ("[Tlhe
Comptroller General shall audit the financial transactions of each agency.").
165. See id. § 3511 (2012).
166. Stith, supra note 3, at 1390.
167. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). In Bowsher, the Court struck down the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings' (GRH) deficit provision, reasoning that the Comptroller General, a leg-
islative officer, cannot exercise authority over how the President executes budget
laws. While the holding is narrowly tailored, the case curtailed GAO's authority.
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 729 n.137
(2000) ("[T]he American separation of powers doctrine is relatively uncongenial
to the GAO, based on a fear of excessive encroachment on the powers of the exec-
utive branch."); see Kate Stith, Rewriting The Fiscal Constitution: The Case of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593 (1988).
168. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 728.
169. See 1 GAO RED BOOK, supra note 3, at 1-22 n.39 (" IC]ertain agencies and activities
are not subject to audit by reason of specific statutory prohibitions and the type of
funds involved."). In addition, "independent" government-chartered corpora-
tions, like USPS or Fannie Mae, are not subject to GAO audits.
170. If Congress were to give GAO enforcement authority with respect to its reporting
obligation, it should not conflict with the holding in Bowsher. It is theoretically
possible that the Court could reach a similar conclusion, i.e., that allowing GAO
to determine the adequacy of reporting is usurping the executive's "take care"
power. But as discussed in Parts I and II, the Statement and Account Clause is
unquestionably a legislative mandate. If anything, it can be argued that Congress
has impermissibly delegated its reporting duties to the executive branch.
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ticularly important because it would allow GAO to compel an executive agency
to provide more robust financial information. 7' This would effectively make
GAO the arbiter of disputes between budget actors and reporting agencies. To-
day, GAO can only issue non-binding opinions against executive agencies with
respect to reporting norms. In addition, Congress could also embed GAO audi-
tors within agencies akin to inspectors general. 72 Since many of the reporting
issues arise at the agency level, giving GAO auditors direct access to agencies (as
opposed to working through the budget agencies) would be particularly use-
ful."1 Several scholars have raised the idea of "embedded experts" with respect
to national security oversight. 74 A similar "in-house" model is used by regula-
tors of financial institutions, who have analogous reporting, oversight and risk
management responsibilities. 75 Since "receipts and expenditures," often require
171. Alternatively, Congress could enact a citizen-suit provision allowing for any tax-
payer to challenge reporting processes. Not only is this alternative politically in-
feasible, citizen suit provisions have had mixed results. In addition, the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) already serves a similar function with respect to gov-
ernment disclosures. See, e.g., Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 685 F.2d 698,
700 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding the State Department's decision to deny infor-
mation requested under FOIA).
172. Inspectors general (IGs) are tasked with ensuring that agencies comply with the
letter of the law. Legal requirements related to reporting are only a small piece of
an IG's duties. By contrast, the primary duty of "in house" GAO auditors would
be to ensure robust, complete, and accurate reporting. See PAUL C. LIGHT,
MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 26 (1993).
173. While the concept of "in house" GAO auditors is new, agencies are already re-
quired to comply with a number of "internal control" requirements issued by
GAO. See, e.g., Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C. § 66(a)
(2012) (requiring agencies to establish internal accounting and administrative
control systems in accordance with GAO standards).
174. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 24 (2008) (advocating for "a cadre of informational ombudsmen within
the executive branch-with the highest security clearances-whose job is to en-
sure that the government deploys information collection techniques legally and
nonarbitrarily"); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Deci-
sionmaking in Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 96 (20o8) (proposing
independent "embedded privacy experts" in the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity "specifically charged with advancing privacy among competing agency inter-
ests, located in a central position within the agency decisionmaking structure ...
and able to operate with relative independence").
175. On embedding regulators within financial firms, see Aaron Lucchetti, The Regula-
tor Down the Hall: Fed and Comptroller of Currency Bolster the Ranks of Staffers
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complex risk assessments to determine future liabilities, giving GAO enhanced
auditing powers and access to data would be particularly useful."'
And, importantly, this proposal seeks to bring government into compliance
with the Statement and Account Clause's mandate through existing institution-
al capacity. Thus, it avoids the temptation to add another institutional actor to
an already complex area of federal reporting that involves hundreds of govern-
ment agencies. It also avoids the imposition of yet another annual report that
will merely reproduce the incomplete information already printed in the Presi-
dent's Budget, the Economic Outlook, and the Consolidated Financial Report.
While this proposal cannot prevent Congress from enacting new reporting
exemptions or distortive accounting rules, expanding GAO's powers would
provide an institutional mechanism for highlighting reporting deficiencies. It
would also markedly improve the quality of agency-level financial data being
provided to budget actors. And, perhaps most importantly, this proposal would
bring renewed attention to the Statement and Account Clause's mandate.
CONCLUSION
The Statement and Account Clause poses a unique challenge. The simplici-
ty of the Clause stands in contrast to the increasing complexity of government
finances. Today, it is especially important that the public and legislators have a
complete understanding of the government's receipts and expenditures. Stand-
ards, although imperfect, are set for public companies to provide investors with
transparency and accountability in financial statements, as well as to diminish
the possibility of fraud and corruption. The Statement and Account Clause was
intended to provide the public with the same protections vis-a-vis their gov-
ernment. It is incumbent upon Congress to carry out this mandate to create
transparency and accountability, to ensure continued oversight of public funds,
and to prevent corruption. Given the complexities of today's "receipts and ex-
penditures," expanded GAO audits may indeed be one way to better fulfill this
constitutionally required reporting.
Meeting this constitutional mandate is no easy task, but it is certainly a task
worthy of pursuit. While the task of producing a comprehensive report of fed-
eral financial activities is potentially an onerous and unpopular duty, a better
understanding of our nation's fiscal health is necessary to achieve fiscal respon-
sibility. It is also an essential aspect of how citizens evaluate their elected repre-
sentatives in a democratic government. Therefore, renewed attention to the
Statement and Account Clause is not merely an accounting issue. It is critical to
protecting our democracy.
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176. GAO has recognized the increasing need for agencies to better assess and manage
the financial risk incurred on behalf of the taxpayer. See U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o1-385T, LONG-TERM BUDGET ISSUES: MOVING
FROM BALANCING THE BUDGET TO BALANCING FISCAL RISK (2001).
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